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Narrative Art as a Colonizing Process: 
An Analysis of the Meta-Fictional Objective of J. M. Coetzee's Foe 
Kelli Zellner '02 
An analysis of Coetzee's novel reveals that the 
meta-fictional narrative contained in Foe portrays nar-
rative writing as a colonizing act, while the internal 
narrative it contains depicts colonization as the act of 
writing or creating an identity for the colonized other' 
(Coetzee, Doublin~ the Point 247). 1 The progression 
of the novel is poignantly described by George Packer 
as quoted in Penner, ''Foe reads as if Coetzee started 
out to reinvent Defoe's famous tale through a woman's 
eyes, became intrigued with the linguistic and philo-
sophical implications, and ended up writing a commen-
tary on the elusiveness of his own project" (129). 
Coetzee admits in Doubling the Point, "Where I do my 
liberating, my playing with possibilities, is in my fic-
tion [not in criticism]. To put it in another way: I am 
concerned to write the kind of novel-to work in the 
kind of novel form-in which one is not unduly handi-
capped (compared with the philosopher) when one plays 
(or works) with ideas" (246). 
One of the ideas that Coetzee "plays with" is that 
there is no absolute truth in a narrative or in life--only 
constructed accounts of individual perceptions exist. 
One of the first places that the reader encounters the 
notion that Susan is relating only her perceptions oc-
curs when she says, "They say Britain is an island too, 
a great island. But that is a mere geographer's notion. 
The earth under our feet is firm in Britain, as it never 
was on Crusoe's island" (Coetzee, Foe 26). Later, she 
demonstrates an understanding that she is perceived by 
others, and that these perceptions are more important 
in society than who she really is: "I laughed when he 
said this-what kind of woman was I, in truth?" 
(Coetzee, Foe 42). Susan and Foe relate their unique 
perceptions of their own first meeting during their banter 
on pages 138-139, further reinforcing that life is a se-
ries of varying views. 
This also applies to the narrative. That is, stories 
are constructions of truth bent to the perceptions and 
desires of the storyteller. Sus an asserts that, "to tell the 
truth in all its substance ... " one must have imagination 
and mastery of language (Coetzee, Foe 51). Later in 
the book, she gains a deeper understanding of the role 
of the storyteller, and this is demonstrated when she 
tells Foe, "the story I desire to be known by is the story 
of the island. You call it an episode, but I call it a story 
in its own right," (Coetzee, Foe 121). 
Susan realizes that one of the few freedoms she 
has is the autonomy to tell her own story and that of 
her castaway companions. She colonizes them as she 
constructs a story that meets her desires: "All of which 
makes up a story I do not choose to tell. I choose not to 
tell it because to no one, not even to you [Foe], do I 
owe proof that I am a substantial being with a substan-
tial history in the world. I choose rather to tell of the 
island, of myself and Cruso and Friday and what we 
three did there: for I am a free woman who asserts her 
freedom by telling her story according to her own de-
sire," (Coetzee, Foe 131). She only maintains this ten-
able power, however, when she is relating her story to 
Foe. Once he writes it for the rest of the world, her 
autonomy is lost. 
Coetzee shows that truth does not matter, only 
the appearance/substance of truth is important in life 
and in art. One cannot have this substance without a 
story, and that story can be told only from the position 
of colonizer. It will contain a construction of the iden-
tity of the colonized through the perception of the colo-
nizer. The substance of truth that is necessary for a 
person to defme his own identity must be constructed 
through a story told from the colonial perspective of 
that person to a colonized individual. Without a sub-
jective audience, one has nothing to confmn the truth 
of his/her being. The only substance of truth that can 
be constructed or told in a narrative is that of the colo-
nizer or subjugator. 
All storytellers are colonizers and all subjects of 
stories are colonized. Coetzee advises the reader that 
words are tools used in subjecting the other to one's 
will or colonizing him/her (Coetzee, Foe 60). Susan 
attempts to persuade Foe of this point: 
The story of Friday's tongue is a story unable 
to be told, or unable to be told by me. That is 
to say, many stories can be told of Friday's 
tongue, but the true story is buried within Fri-
day, who is mute. The true story will not be 
heard till by art we have found a means of giv-
ing voice to Friday" (Coetzee, Foe 118) 
Foe and Barton, by the end of part III, have not 
succeeded in giving Friday a voice, and given the events 
in part IV, it seems that they never do. 
Cruso also lacks a voice in the story. He becomes 
a colonized other. Susan asks: "Who but Cruso, who 
is no more, could truly tell you Cruso's story?" 
(Coetzee, Foe 51) "Truly," the answer is no one. Ver-
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sions of his story, however, can be told by the coloniz-
ing others, Susan and Foe. Susan understands her power 
over the story of Cruso. She says, " . . .it is I who have 
disposal of all that Cruso leaves behind, which is the 
story of his island" (Coetzee, Foe 45). When she tells 
her story to Foe in her own language, and he receives 
it, the usual colonial relationship of gender is reversed. 
She becomes the colonizer, he the colonized other, (as 
is represented by her calling him "wife" on page 152) 
and by the "muse," Susan, tupping him in order to be-
get her story (Coetzee, Foe 139-40). This reversal only 
stands, however, until he begins to write her story for 
others, then she is once again subjugated and colonized. 
This occurs when Foe begins to distort Susan's story 
by constructing it to suit his desires. She realizes this, 
and says, "Once you proposed to supply a middle by 
inventing cannibals and pirates. These I would reject 
because they were not the truth," (Coetzee, Foe 121). 
She must not allow Foe complete autonomy in telling 
her story if she wishes for her perceptions of the truth 
to be maintained. 
Expanding these ideas to include, not only the 
narrative, but also civilized life, Coetzee implies the 
following: 1. Individuals must tell stories in order to 
live. 2. Because stories are inevitable acts of coloni-
zation, all human relationships are colonial in nature. 
3. Only history or life that imitates art is plausible. 4. 
To tell the story of another is to not only colonize, but 
also to kill or arrest change in him/her. 
Mark Doty writes, in Firebird: A Memoir, "[W]e 
live the stories we tell [ .. . ] what matters is what we 
learn to make of what happens to us. And we learn to 
make, I think, by telling" (183). If this is true, then 
people in a society tell stories to live. The need for 
storytelling is a result of what Bordo calls, in the vein 
ofFoucaultian philosophy, "constitutive" power of co-
lonial/post-colonial society. It is one of the "mecha-
nisms that shape and proliferate-rather than repress-
desire, generate and focus our energies, construct out 
conceptions of normalcy and deviance" (2365). 
Because of this condition, it seems there can never 
be a non-colonial experience in the modem world. 
Freedom from colonialism exists only in theory because 
colonization can never be reversed or erased. Coetzee 
provides a metaphor for this irreversibility in Susan 's 
thoughts: "An aversion came over me that we feel for 
all the mutilated. Why is that so, do you think? Be-
cause they put us in mind of what we would rather for-
get: how easily, at the stroke of a sword or a knife, 
wholeness and beauty are forever undone? Perhaps" 
(Coetzee, Foe 85). Friday's tongue symbolizes the 
colonized other, which, once affected by colonization, 
can never return to its former state. 
This quote addresses the second point, that all 
human relationships, because they are based on sto-
ries, are colonial, and that the relationship between the 
colonizer and the colonized is dependent upon a condi-
tion: that the desires of the colonizer are the only de-
sires known. For the colonizer, to learn the desires of 
the colonized is to acknowledge him/her as human-
as having a soul-, and to do so deconstructs the 
colonizer's perceptions of his/her role in the world. It 
does so by forcing the colonizer to realize that his/her 
role is dependent upon the role of the colonized, a role 
assigned to him/her by the colonizer and which does 
not meet his/her desires. Therefore, the story of the 
colonized must never (can never?) be told to the colo-
nizer if roles are to be maintained. As Durant points 
out, the history of colonization is "the history of the 
forgetting of the humanity of certain peoples," ( 435). 
The character of Foe speaks to this when talking to 
Susan about Friday, "[W]e deplore the barbarism of 
whoever maimed him, yet have we, his later masters, 
not reason to be secretly grateful? For as long as he is 
dumb we can tell ourselves his desires are dark to us, 
and continue to use him as we wish" (Coetzee, Foe 
148). 
To destroy the colonizing relationship, the desires 
of the colonized must be made known to the colonizer 
but, as is represented by Friday's missing tongue and 
subsequent silence, the story/desires of the colonized 
cannot be told to the colonizer because to do so the 
colonized must use the language of the colonizer. 
Therefore, ''Friday's story is unavailable, unless it is to 
be appropriated and misrepresented" (Head 121) to be 
told by the colonizer. For the colonizer, to tell the story 
of the colonized inevitably is to create a comfortable 
truth regarding him/her-not to tell his/her true story. 
In Susan's perception, Foe attempts to colonize 
her reality to make it a part of the greater story he will 
tell the world of her by concocting the young Susan 
Barton and planting her in Susan's life to "make his 
fiction come to life and persuade her of its validity" 
(Penner 120). Here, he attempts to not only write her 
identity, but her experience in the world in order to suit 
his desire. 
The History of the colonized (as represented by 
the story of the parentage of the young Susan Barton) 
is known only through stories told by the colonizer (the 
father). The colonized can only be known to the world 
in terms of the identity constructed for him/her by the 
colonizer. The colonized individual does not have a 
reader/audience (mother), only a writer (father) 
(Coetzee, Foe 91). Individuals in modem society are 
constantly being written by the colonizing other. 
Through Susan 's rejection of the mysterious girl 
claiming to be her daughter, Coetzee articulates the idea 
that the only believable history is that which imitates 
art. She says, "The world is full of stories of mothers 
searching for sons and daughters they gave away once, 
long ago. But there are no stories of daughters search-
ing for mothers. There are no stories of such quests 
because they do not occur. They are not part of life" 
(Coetzee, Foe 77). Susan uses this as justification for 
refusing to believe in the young Susan Barton is her 
daughter. "Thus, to be plausible, life must imitate art," 
(Penner 121). If this is regarded as reasonable-life 
imitates stories-, and all true events have stories told 
about them, then is it not true that nothing has existed 
unless a story has been told about it? Is story-telling a 
condition of existence? If lack of evidence, of a story, 
is evidence of lack of existence, then it may be said 
that Friday does not truly exist or have a past outside 
himself nor partially outside the minds of Susan and 
Foe. His story is not told, therefore, he does not exist 
outside the partial story/identity of him that Susan and 
Foe maintain through their interactions with him. But 
if Friday dies, will he cease to have existed? Perhaps 
he will then be only an idea of a partial existence in the 
mind of the colonizing others. 
The final idea, that to tell a story about a person is 
to end his/her life or make them static, is dealt with 
most intensely by Coetzee in the fourth section of the 
novel when he supplants Susan as the narrator. To tell 
a story is to colonize, which in itself is an act of objec-
tification and classification that takes what is insub-
stantial in life and freezes it in art and in the mind of 
the colonizer (Penner 118). Such is the nature of the 
narrative. To tell one's story is to necessitate his/her 
death (Penner 127). This is true whether the subject is 
living or not. Cruso dies one-third of the way into the 
book, and as such, his story is left to be told by Susan 
(Coetzee, Foe 45). Paulo Pasolini, in an essay describ-
ing why that of Oedipus is a story, articulates the na-
ture of this storyteller-subject relationship: 
The moment the subject dies, there occurs a 
lightening synthesis of the span of his life. 
Thousands of actions, expressions, sounds, 
voices, words are lost forever, and no more than 
a few tens or hundreds survive. The enormous 
number of words of his life are lost in an infi-
nite and silent abyss. But some of these words 
linger on, miraculously; they are inscribed in 
memory like epigrams. They hang forever in 
the light of a morning, or in the sweet shadows 
of an evening: his wife, his friends , when they 
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remember them, shed a tear. The task of the 
storyteller is to select the relevant words, the 
ones which by chance survived the disaster. 
Death is the necessary condition to make a story 
of his life. Death has sanctified a version of 
what he once was. (Pasolini 6-7) 
The storyteller, in selecting details of a subject to 
include in a story of him/her, creates this "condition" 
of death in the subject. Cruso is dead in reality, but the 
other subjects of the colonizing narratives are still alive 
in reality, and yet, are made static by the stories that 
write their identities. As such, Susan as narrator 'kills' 
every character in the novel, while Coetzee, after Defoe, 
does the same. 
But it is not just the characters whose existences 
are arrested. It is everything in the world of the narra-
tive as well. As Penner points out, "Until a reality, even 
a reality embroidered with colorful lies, is fixed in the 
durable pigments of words, it is protean, shifting, van-
ishing [ . . . ] Barton's principal concern [the principal 
concern of the novel?] is the relationship of fiction to 
life. Revising her earlier insistence ... on the primacy 
of truth in art, she now accepts the truism that 'what 
we can accept in life, we cannot accept in history ' " 
(Penner, 118). To write a story is to create a history, to 
send things into the past and make them static. Here, 
they can be objectified, classified, made both mythic 
and comprehensible. In addition, they must be shaped 
and distorted until they are acceptable. 
The only character whose story escapes this end-
ing is also the most symbolic character in the novel, 
Friday. He is subject to Susan's writing of him while 
they are still alive, a fact of which Susan is well aware: 
Friday has no command of words and there-
fore no defence [sic] against being re-shaped 
day by day in conformity with the desires of 
others. I say he is a cannibal and he becomes a 
cannibal; I say he is a laundryman and he be-
comes a laundryman. What is the truth of Fri-
day? You will respond ... he is a substantial 
body, he is himself, Friday is Friday. But that 
is not so. No matter what he is to himself 
.. . what he is to the world is what I make of 
him. (Coetzee, Foe 121) 
But as for being laid down in Susan's narrative 
and "liv[ing] forever, after a manner" his story alone 
eludes this end (Coetzee, Foe 58). Perhaps the most 
abstract part of the novel, section four serves to sug-
gest that because Friday's muteness protects him from 
becoming haltingly contained in a narrative, he "lives 
forever, after a [different] manner." At the end of the 
novel, three hundred years after the other characters 
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have passed, Friday is still alive (Coetzee, Foe 157). 
He escaped the fate of those who are destined to be-
come fixed in the past, read about, and forgotten. In-
stead, he evades language as an agent of oppression 
(Penner 127) and is found by the narrator in his home, 
a place "where bodies are their own signs," (Coetzee, 
Foe 157) singing with "the voice of man," (Coetzee, 
Foe 22) which flows "to the ends of the earth" (Coetzee, 
Foe 157). This can be seen as symbolic of the concept 
that Friday and the ideas he embodies live on in the 
consciousness of all people in the world, even without 
a Susan Barton or a Mr. Foe to tell his story. In fact, 
Friday reaches people who will never learn of such 
characters, never read a story. 
To conclude, one must look back to a conversa-
tion early in the book. In the scene, Susan tries to con-
vince Cruse of the value of keeping a journal: 
Suppose, that one day we are saved. Would 
you not regret it that you could not bring back 
with you some record of your years of ship-
wreck, so that what you have passed through 
shall not die from memory? And if we are 
never saved . . . would you not wish for a me-
morial to be left behind, so that the next voy-
agers to make landfall here . . . may read and 
learn about us , and perhaps shed a tear? ... with 
every day that passes, our memories grow less 
certain . . . what memories do you even now pre-
serve ... ? (Coetzee, Foe 17) 
· At the end of this speech, Susan feels that Cruse 
is unmoved, and indeed, he does not agree with her 
logic. He replies, "Nothing is forgotten . .. nothing I have 
forgotten is worth the remembering," (Coetzee, Foe 17). 
This suggests that writing, as asserted earlier, is not 
only a colonial act of construction which takes the elu-
sive and changing and forces it into an enclosure which 
stifles its vital reality, but also, contradictory to Susan's 
beliefs, one of allowing to forget. 
Writing something down makes it constantly ac-
cessible whenever one desires to read it. As such, one 
does not have to labor to remember it or store it in the 
mind for recall. Rather, one can forget or ignore it at 
any or every moment one chooses, for it is in no dan-
ger of being lost-it is written down. And one can 
choose when to revisit it, if ever. Michiko Kakutani is 
quoted in Penner as saying, "the operative forces [of 
Foe l are not so much history or politics as art and imagi-
nation-how can one individual's story be apprehended 
and translated through language by another?" (113). 
One may conclude from a close reading of Foe that the 
"apprehension and translation" into narrative art of re-
alities and lives, including (or especially), those colo-
nized lives of pain, such as Friday's, can be done only 
at the inevitable risk of distorting them or allowing them 
to be altogether forsaken . As a child of post-colonial 
civilization, if one resolves to attempt a process of de-
parture from colonial activity, one must, as Coetzee 
seems to have realized in the course of his novel, relin-
quish the right to tell the story of the colonized other. 
Notes: 
1 The colonized other is one whose subjectivity 
is "continually located in the gaze of the imperial Other 
[or colonizer]," (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 170). 
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